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ABSTRACT—In this article, I reflect on theory of mind as a
field, including how it arose and how it developed. My
research has been intertwined with this process; beginning
right out of graduate school, my career developed along
with the field, and I contributed to the field and its devel-
opment at various points. So this essay also traces my path
as I strived, and still strive, to understand how theory of
mind begins and unfolds in human development, what
forces shape that development, and what accounts best
explain the timetables and progressions of theory-of-mind
understandings in humans. I end with my sense of where
theory-of-mind research is likely to head in the near
future.
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Edmund Wilson, the famous evolutionary biologist, reportedly
told aspiring researchers that a good scientist should be bright
enough to spot a promising research endeavor, but not so bright
as to become bored doing it. For 35 years, I have not been
bored with theory of mind.
There was a time before theory of mind, of course, both for
developmental science and for me. For graduate school, I chose
the Institute of Child Development at Minnesota because, being
a preschool teacher, there I could opt for either an academic or
an early childhood education degree. Fortunately, my assigned
advisor was John Flavell. He was the foremost expert on Piaget
outside of Geneva, but at that point I had not heard of Flavell or
Piaget. I was quickly drawn to Piaget for his insistence on con-
structionism to understand development, an approach I believe
in to this day. But my research with Flavell was focused on
memory development and then metacognition, a topic that was
being created from scratch in my years at Minnesota.
My interest in metacognition morphed into a more basic one
involving what children think about the mind more generally,
not just their ideas about memory and learning. This more aptly
fed my Piaget-fueled intrigue with children’s concepts. At Min-
nesota, Carl Johnson and I began revisiting Piaget’s claims
about children’s understanding of mind.
One thing that benefitted the field and me is that, early on,
theory of mind attracted some unusually insightful scholars who,
while often at odds, were collegial and open to argument, data,
and alternative viewpoints; these included Paul Harris, Alison
Gopnik, Josef Perner, Alan Leslie, and Janet Astington. They
and others continued developing the topic while recruiting stu-
dents and junior colleagues to the endeavor, and seducing some
senior scholars like Flavell.
In what follows, I outline where we have been, where we are,
and my sense of directions for the future. My own insider
appraisals clearly color this synopsis: Mine is not an unbiased
perspective and this is not unbiased history.
ORIGINS, IN TWOS
The question of how people come to understand their own and
others’ minds has a long history in philosophy and psychology.
But two thrusts launched the field within developmental science.
For some, like me, interests morphed from metacognition to
mind. For others, David Premack and Guy Woodruff’s (1) semi-
nal article, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” set
things off. That phrase—theory of mind—caught on quickly, in
part, because it was catchy. But for some of us, it also aptly fit
an emerging theory theory: the theoretical claim that children’s
conceptual development constitutes na€ıve theory development
(2–4). In my view, theory of mind remains the best example of a
foundational theory of everyday cognition, an early developing
na€ıve psychology that complements children’s na€ıve physics and
biology (5).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Henry M. Wellman, Department of Psychology, University of
Michigan, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 49109; e-mail: hmw@
umich.edu.
© 2017 The Author
Child Development Perspectives© 2017 The Society for Research in Child Development
DOI: 10.1111/cdep.12236
Volume 11, Number 3, 2017, Pages 207–214
CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
Two conferences in 1986 incubated the field further, one
organized by Astington and Gopnik at Toronto, one organized by
Harris at Oxford. Several of us attended both; the resulting
papers were collected into a book (6), a rare edited volume that
shaped research for years to come. Two early books, one by me
(7) and one by Perner (8), helped create further interest.
Finally, two aspects of mind were covered in early work:
roughly, mental states and mental entities. Understanding men-
tal states was studied by assessing 3- to 6-year-olds’ apprecia-
tion of how agents’ beliefs and desires work together to produce
intentional behavior (9), including actions driven by false beliefs
(10). Comprehending mental entities involved assessing chil-
dren’s understanding that thoughts and physical objects (e.g., a
thought about a dog vs. a dog, or thoughts vs. close imposters,
such as air, shadows, and moving pictures) are two very different
sorts of things, one nonmaterial and mental, the other physical,
tangible, and real (7). Contradicting Piaget’s claims about child-
hood realism, young children were surprisingly good at both of
these nonobvious and abstract understandings.
DEVELOPMENT
Development includes origins and change, and so does this
field. Over the years, research expanded in breadth and depth,
producing studies on the development of theory of mind in
infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and even late life;
on emotion understanding; and on children’s conversations
about people and minds through the use of terms like think,
want, feel, and guess. Researchers have also examined underpin-
nings of theory-of-mind understandings in evolutionary pro-
cesses, neural processes, and developmental learning (including
computational models of constructivist learning); development
in typical and atypical populations (e.g., individuals with autism
or deafness); and individual differences in theory-of-mind devel-
opment.
Individual differences are no more or less important than these
other topics, but individual variation in reaching theory-of-mind
milestones helped address antecedents of theory-of-mind compe-
tence, such as engagement in pretend play, having siblings, fre-
quency of engagement in explanatory conversations, and growing
up bilingual. The research has been not only longitudinal and
correlational, but also experimental, including microgenetic
studies designed to accelerate the ordinary experiences that
arguably propel theory-of-mind acquisition. Similarly, such vari-
ation allowed investigators to show that theory-of-mind develop-
ments have wide-ranging consequences, including significant
impacts on children’s friendships and popularity, engagement
in lying and deception, game-playing skills, strategies for
persuading or arguing with others, and transition to school.
The list does not end there: Theory-of-mind advances predict
children’s cognitive skills, such as their metacognitive strategies
(harkening back to metacognition), learning reading and mathe-
matics content, and acceptance of feedback from teachers.
Researchers have looked at variations in upbringing to identify
both universal and culture-specific aspects of theory-of-mind
conceptions and trajectories. They have also examined relations
with languages being acquired. Research with monkeys, chim-
panzees, and surprisingly, dogs has shed light on the nature of
distinctively human theory of mind (harkening back to Premack
and Woodruff). That research has inspired theories, such as the
social brain hypothesis (11), which argue that evolutionary
increases in social cognition fueled advances in human intelli-
gence more broadly. (For supporting information and references
for these areas, see ref. 12.) These discoveries attest to the
health of the field. Moreover, several of these topics are particu-
larly rich in data and debate, allowing for deeper consideration
of past developments and pointing to directions for research.
Developmental Progressions in Understanding Theory of
Mind
Early on, many researchers studying theory of mind became
obsessed with false belief. False-belief tasks, as in Figure 1, can
be very simple, and have many variants appropriate to different
cultures and contexts. This led to hundreds of studies and sev-
eral revealing meta-analyses e.g., (13). While false belief was, in
hindsight, a lucky find, focus on a single task (even in aggre-
gated batteries) is misleading and “not very developmental” (14,
p. 316). A wider developmental perspective was clearly needed.
Theory-of-mind understandings begin in infancy, but also pro-
gress: Early understandings of intentional action give way to
later belief-desire systems of understanding, where children
show knowledge that actions are produced from an agent’s
desires and beliefs in combination. At its simplest, we see peo-
ple engaging in actions they believe will get them what they
want. Even preschoolers do this.
Clearly, such understandings must encompass notions about
desires as well as beliefs, and researchers discovered early that
children understood certain things about desires before achiev-
ing parallel insights about beliefs. For example, as outlined in
Table 1, on simple tasks, children understand diverse desires
before understanding diverse beliefs. A progression from reason-
ing about desires to reasoning about beliefs also characterizes
children’s conversations (15, 16).
More extended progressions of understanding further charac-
terize theory-of-mind development and have been useful in illu-
minating the origins and mechanisms of development and
change. Consider the theory-of-mind scale (17) that encom-
passes carefully constructed tasks assessing children’s under-
standing of all the distinctions in Table 1. Studies using this
scale with hundreds of preschoolers in Australia, Canada, Ger-
many, and the United States show a consistent order of diffi-
culty, as seen going from top to bottom in Table 1. Validated
progressions like this allow deeper examination of development,
including the extent to which theory-of-mind developments are
culturally universal or specific, and do or do not depend on
specific childhood experiences.
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One possibility is that early theory-of mind achievements rep-
resent maturational unfolding of some theory-of-mind device or
module. If so, then sequences and timetables for theory-of-mind
developments should be universal. Alternatively, perhaps the-
ory-of-mind understandings are the products of social and evi-
dential experiences that vary from child to child and across
communities. Tests of such alternatives were undertaken, in
part, by comparing Western and Chinese children. Many schol-
ars contrast an Asian focus on people sharing group commonali-
ties and interdependence with a Western focus on people as
distinctively individual and independent. Indeed, in conversa-
tion with young children, Chinese parents comment frequently
on knowing (18), including consensual knowledge that everyone
should learn, while American parents comment more on
?
Figure 1. Two common false-belief tasks for children.
Note. False-belief tasks have many forms, but two common ones use changed locations (top) or deceptive contents (bottom). Younger children consistently
incorrectly say the character will search in the cupboard (where the target object really is) or will think the Band-Aid box has a toy truck inside.
Table 1
The Theory-of-Mind Scale Items.
Task Brief description
1. Diverse desires Child judges that two persons (the child versus someone else or two other people) have different desires
about the same object (e.g., one likes broccoli and the other does not).
2. Diverse beliefs Child judges that two persons have different beliefs about the same object, when the child does not know
which belief is true or false (e.g., one thinks an occluded box holds a car and the other thinks it holds a
ball).
3. Knowledge access Child judges another person’s ignorance about the contents of a container when child knows what is in the
container (e.g., child knows drawer hides a toy dog, but child judges that another person who has never
seen inside does not know what is there).
4. Contents false beliefa Child judges another person’s false belief about what is in a distinctive container when child knows what is
in the container (e.g., child knows a familiar Band-Aid box has a truck inside, but judges what someone
else who has never seen inside will think it contains).
5. Hidden emotion Child judges that a person can feel one thing but display a different emotion (e.g., character feels sad but
can look happy on his face).
aOther false-belief tasks can be used. For several reasons (17) contents false belief is the task included in the standard five-step scale.
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thinking (15), including differences in thoughts among different
individuals.
Accordingly, Chinese preschoolers show a consistent but dif-
ferent theory-of-mind sequence from that of Western children in
which knowledge access and diverse beliefs are reversed (19).
After early understanding of basic aspects of desire, Western
children first appreciate differences in beliefs, whereas Chinese
children first appreciate acquisition of and access to knowledge
—as do children in Iran (20) and Turkey. The two sequences
are crucially different (indicating experience-dependent pro-
cesses of theory-of-mind learning) yet notably similar (indicating
robust, universal theory-of-mind development).
Theory-of-mind timetables differ as well, sometimes dramati-
cally. An early discovery that false-belief understanding is sub-
stantially delayed in autistic children led to the theory-of-mind
hypothesis for autism (21). But autism, with its neurologically
based, across-the-board delays, could have its own delayed mat-
urational timetable. Yet deaf children, who do not suffer from
the same central neurological impairments and retardation as
children with autism, also often have serious theory-of-mind
delays.
About 95% of deaf children are born to hearing parents and
(unlike deaf children of deaf parents) grow up with early experi-
ences that are very different from their hearing peers. For exam-
ple, hearing parents mostly communicate didactically with their
young deaf child using simple signs or gestures to refer to
objects. Moreover, their deaf children are likely to have
restricted play with others, resulting in less access to free-flow-
ing social–communicative interactions, and little exposure to
discourse about internal states like thoughts and emotions. Deaf
children of hearing parents are substantially delayed in under-
standing false beliefs, like children with autism (22). More com-
prehensively, they have consistently delayed sequences of
understandings on the theory-of-mind scale, taking 12 or more
years to progressively achieve theory-of-mind insights that
hearing children achieve in 4–6 years (23).
Infants’ Theory of Mind
Theory-of-mind research began with older children and scrolled
backward toward infancy. The earliest examples of psychologi-
cal construals of people appear in infants’ understandings of
intentional action and experience; by the end of the first year,
children begin to treat themselves and others as intentional
agents that have internal experiences.
Consider infant gaze following. Conceivably, infants may just
automatically match an adult’s gaze, without any deeper under-
standing. In fact, young infants often gaze follow adults wearing
blindfolds. Yet, when 12-month-olds have experience with
blindfolds occluding their own vision (24), they are significantly
less likely to follow a blindfolded adult’s gaze. By 18 months,
infants do not often gaze follow a blindfolded adult—presumably
they now understand that blindfolds occlude visual experience.
But when they have experience with a special blindfold that
looks opaque yet is easily seen through, 18-month-olds
follow the head turns of adults wearing that blindfold. Thus, by
12–18 months, infants have a sense that people’s visual experi-
ences control their gaze (which represents more than just overt
eye or head directedness).
In the last 10 years, researchers have claimed that infants go
beyond an understanding of intentional actions and experiences:
By 10–15 months, they recognize that people act on the basis of
their beliefs and false beliefs. The top of Figure 2 presents an
initial influential task by Kristine Onishi and Renee Baillargeon
(25). Other demonstrations have accumulated step by step.
Although these studies are clever and revealing, how their
findings should best be interpreted remains controversial.
For example, such findings are often interpreted in deeply
nativist fashions as revealing initial understandings that emerge
without learning. But recent research with deaf infants of hear-
ing parents shows that they do not show the same false-belief
responses that hearing infants do (26). In my view, experience-
dependent (constructivist) learning characterizes theory-of-mind
understanding from its beginning. Regardless of whether these
studies reveal that infants truly understand false beliefs, they
confirm that infants typically understand agents as goal directed,
that agents’ changing experiences yield for them awareness or
unawareness of key events, and that aware and unaware agents
act differently.
One pressing question from this research with infants con-
cerns how infants’ understandings relate to later theory-of-mind
accomplishments (which, recall, shape children’s social actions
and interactions profoundly). At the least, we now know that
individual differences in infants’ social-cognitive understandings
longitudinally predict differences in the timing of preschoolers’
theory-of-mind achievements (27, 28).
Chimpanzees and Dogs
What sorts of theory-of-mind achievements are apparent in our
closest primate relatives? This provocative question, posed by
Premack and Woodruff, has an extended history. For many
years, the conclusion was: none (29, 30). Primates performed
poorly on all sorts of tasks (many with parallels in research on
human infants) designed to demonstrate awareness of the inter-
nal states of others. But this early research used cooperative–
communicative paradigms, where success depended on appreci-
ating that someone’s goal was to help (e.g., share food with the
chimpanzee). In competition paradigms, chimpanzees performed
more optimally. For example, take a situation in which a piece
of food is placed between a dominant and a subordinate chim-
panzee and, because of various visual obstacles, the two have
differing awareness of the food; when subordinates can see two
pieces of food and the dominant chimpanzee sees only one, sub-
ordinates preferentially target the less-risky food that the domi-
nant chimpanzee cannot see. Studies suggest that chimpanzees
demonstrate these preferences because they understand some-
thing about the link between seeing and knowing (31): They
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adjust their behavior not only on the basis of what dominants
can currently see, but also on the basis of what dominants have
and have not seen in the past. Rhesus monkeys also show
impressive sensitivity to others’ perceptual experiences in com-
petitive situations.
Unlike chimpanzees, domestic dogs perform well on simple
tasks where they read the cooperative–communicative intentions
and experiences of humans. One influential hypothesis is that
dogs evolved this human-infant-like social-cognitive prowess in
their long history of domestication, with the key being the
domestication of their temperaments (to be nonaggressively,
nonfearfully attentive to humans; 32). This temperament hypoth-
esis led to research with young children. Children (even infants)
who are nonaggressively, nonfearfully attentive to others perform
more optimally on theory-of-mind tasks. And they do so concur-
rently and also in longitudinal research where early measures of
observant-reflective social temperament predict theory-of-mind
achievements several years later (33).
Developments Beyond Preschool
Children’s understanding of mind and of people develops in
important respects beyond the ages of 5 or 6 years. For exam-
ple, only after the preschool years do children develop a
deepening appreciation of the mind as different from the brain.
When asked whether they can perform various kinds of func-
tions without a brain, and separately without a mind (34, 35),
the youngest children respond identically about the brain and
mind, and they conceive of the mind/brain as needed exclu-
sively for purely mental acts. Only by fifth grade or so do chil-
dren become generally aware that the brain differs from the
mind.
For me, one of the most intriguing later developments con-
cerns children’s increasing willingness to entertain ideas of
extraordinary minds and capacities. Initially, Justin Barrett (36)
demonstrated that as children come to appreciate the constraints
of ordinary human knowledge and belief—for example, that peo-
ple can have false beliefs—they recognize that God could have
more extraordinary powers. Many findings have followed from
this, charting children’s understanding of omniscience, afterlife,
souls, and the like (35, 37). The school-age years are pivotal for
children’s understanding of such extraordinary experiences
(even for those children in devout homes who receive instruction
and exposure to these ideas very early in life; 38). These studies
show that extended progressions in children’s theories of mind
are built on early preschool understandings that provide the
foundation for children’s construction of later ideas, including
Figure 2. Schematic display of conditions used in two different infant violation-of-expectation studies.
Note. A smiley face means the target agent is present, looking at an event phase; a crossed-out face means agent is absent (and cannot see). In (25): If infants
expect the agent to search in a prior location (on the basis of a false belief), then according to violation-of-expectation logic, they should look longer at the
reach white test event (not expecting the agent to search at the correct new location); 15-month-old infants did so.
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their receptivity to and assimilation of sociocultural teachings,
doctrines, and ideas about God, superheroes, Santa Claus, and
more.
GOING FORWARD
It is easy to think of key issues for further research. More
research is needed on how theory of mind operates in adult-
hood, including late life—researchers are just beginning to
consider if theory of mind is party to the general declines of
cognitive aging or resistant to decline. Systematic research on
how early theory-of-mind differences affect children’s later
educational achievements (e.g., in reading, math, and science)
has only begun (for a review see 39). Understanding extraor-
dinary minds goes beyond agents like God and superheroes.
Consider robots and personified smart technological devices
(e.g., Siri, Echo, Alexa); children live in a world that increas-
ingly includes such devices. How do they think and feel
about such devices and how does this affect their interactions
with and learning from them?
Infants
Despite the boom in research with infants, it is deeply incom-
plete: Both developmental research and research specifying
where infants fail as well as succeed are needed. Too often,
demonstrations that infants apparently understand X (false
belief, say) do not test or report boundary-setting conditions
where the same infants fail.
For example, if infants understand false belief in Baillargeon-
type paradigms (see the top of Figure 2), they also must
understand that seeing leads to knowing and not seeing leads to
ignorance. But a few studies suggest they do not, including the
tasks used by Beatte Sodian and Claudia Thoermer (40) at the
bottom of Figure 2. In a true-belief condition for that study (not
shown in Figure 2), children watched an agent that saw all the
movements of a toy that first went into a gray box but then trans-
ferred to a white box (paralleling the Onishi and Baillargeon
false-belief task, except the agent saw everything). Accordingly,
infants then looked longer at the reach-gray test event (because,
given a true belief, the agent should search where the toy actu-
ally is). Furthermore, in the ignorance condition, infants appar-
ently understood that not seeing leads to ignorance because they
did not look longer to either test event (ignorant agents could
search anywhere). However, the true-belief-after-delay condition
shows they probably do not fully understand that seeing leads to
knowledge (or true belief). In that case, although the person saw
the ball go into the gray box, infants did not look longer at the
white box test event. The agent saw all the relevant movements,
and was absent for an irrelevant short time when nothing hap-
pened, but infants failed to understand the agent’s true belief.
Infant successes occur amid as-yet-unknown failures.
Moreover, studies with infants typically report on 15-month-
olds alone, or 18-month-olds alone (and moreover, on different
tasks). We need a progressive developmental picture. Research
on infants’ social-cognitive learning would also be helpful. In
initial studies, infants applied statistical learning to acquire
information about social agents and even to infer their mental
states (41). How much of infant theory-of-mind development
might this account for?
Cognitive Neuroscience
Investigations with adults demonstrate that theory-of-mind rea-
soning involves a network of neural regions, most consistently
the medial prefrontal cortex, and the left and right temporopari-
etal junction, but also several temporal lobe sites (42). These
regions are recruited when adults engage in mental-reasoning
tasks, and they are impaired in autistic adults.
Even if findings from studies with adults were crystal clear—
and they are not—they could not provide an understanding of
brain and cognition earlier in development. Thus, direct neu-
rocognitive examinations of younger children are needed—
especially in children from 2 to 6 or 7 years, when developmen-
tal changes are pronounced. Such developmental neuroscience
is just beginning (43, 44). Emerging research has already begun
to show developmental changes in preschoolers in the theory-of-
mind network, which would seem unlikely if that network were
mature from the start and if theory of mind after infancy merely
reflected changes in executive functions or language, as some
propose (45). Changes in this network are also emerging in older
children, with the potential for more effectively illuminating the-
ory-of-mind changes after the preschool years.
Nonhumans
Research on the theory-of-mind accomplishments (and limits) of
chimps and dogs is also not yet very developmental. Mostly,
such studies have looked at adult animals. How have their now-
mature capacities developed? Perhaps insights that humans
acquire easily early in life are mostly late-developing insights
for chimps and dogs. Developmental research with animals
would help us understand more optimally the phylogenesis and
ontogenesis of social cognition. More detailed information on
other nonhuman species would also be informative. Recent work
with birds seems particularly striking (46).
CONCLUSIONS, SO FAR
Over 30 years, the field of theory of mind has emerged, devel-
oped, and changed. So have I, although I remain not bored with
it all. Instead, I am impressed and energized by how much has
been accomplished. We began in the 1980s focusing on
preschoolers, but now chart theory-of-mind achievements from
infancy through adulthood, from the nursery to the schoolyard to
the classroom and into the highways and byways of social life.
We began with behaviors and now probe neural networks,
genes, and social networks. We began looking at children in a
few Western locales and now look worldwide. We began with
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nothing but questions; now we have many answers, though of
course, answers provoke new questions. So one key accomplish-
ment is a firmer sense of how much remains to be known.
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